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The Afrobarometer has developed an experiential measure of lived poverty (how 
frequently people go without basic necessities during the course of a year) that 
measures a portion of the central core of the concept of poverty not captured by 
existing objective or subjective measures. Empirically, the measure has strong 
individual level construct validity and reliability within any cross national round of 
surveys.  Yet it also displays inconsistent levels of external validity as a measure of 
aggregate level poverty when compared to other objective, material measures of 
poverty or well being. Surprisingly, however, we find that lived poverty is very 
strongly related to country level measures of political freedom. This finding 
simultaneously supports Sen's (1999) arguments about development as freedom, 
corroborates Halperin et al’s (2005) arguments about the “democracy advantage” 
in development, and increases our confidence that we are indeed measuring the 





The Afrobarometer’s central concern has been to describe and explain Africans’ 
understanding of and commitment to political and economic reform. Given the 
prominence of scholarly hypotheses about the central impact of poverty and 
destitution on the prospects of democratization and liberalization, it was vital that 
the Afrobarometer contained a valid, reliable and efficient measure of poverty with 
which to test these propositions. Thus, we developed the Lived Poverty Index (LPI) 
in order to produce an individual level measure of poverty that was both valid and 
reliable, but that could also be easily administered without questioning about 






The Afrobarometer is a systematic, cross-national survey of public attitudes in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is a scientific project dedicated to accurate and precise 
measurement of the attitudes of nationally representative samples of African 
populaces. Given its substantive focus on attitudes about democracy, markets and 
civil society, it is also a policy relevant project that attempts to insert results into 
national and global policy discussions through proactive dissemination and 
outreach. The project has been run as a network comprising three core partners (the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Ghana Centre for Democratic 
Development (CDD-Ghana) and Michigan State University) and 18 African 
national research partners from universities, non-governmental organizations and 
private research firms.1   
 
The Afrobarometer is conducted in “reforming” African countries: generally, 
multi-party regimes that have had a founding democratic election, or a re-
democratizing election.  Round 1 surveys were conducted in 12 countries between 
mid-1999 and mid-2001 in West Africa (Ghana, Mali and Nigeria), East Africa 
(Uganda and Tanzania) and Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  Round 2 was done in 16 countries 
between mid 2002 and late 2003, repeating the original 12 (Zimbabwe could only 
be done in early 2004 due to political tensions) and adding Cape Verde, Kenya, 
Mozambique, and Senegal. Round 3 was conducted in 18 countries between 
February 2005 and February 2006, adding Madagascar and Benin. 
 
                                                 
1 The first three rounds of research, analysis and dissemination have been supported by the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, United States Agency for International 
Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, World Bank, United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, Danish Governance Trust Fund at the World Bank, 
Royal Dutch Embassy in Namibia, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Trocaire Regional Office 
for Eastern Africa, Michigan State University, African Development Bank, U.S. National Science 
Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 
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Table 1:  Afrobarometer Surveys, 1999-2006 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
 Fieldwork Dates Sample Size Fieldwork Dates Sample Size Fieldwork Dates Sample Size
Botswana Nov-December 1999 1200 July-August 2003  1200 May-June 2005  1200 
Ghana July-August 1999 2004 Aug-September 2002 1200 March 2005  1197 
Lesotho April-June 2000 1177 February-April 2003 1200 July-August 2005  1161 
Malawi Nov-December 1999 1208 April-May 2003  1200 June-July 2005  1200 
Mali January-February 2001 2089 Oct-November 2002 1283 June-July 2005  1244 
Namibia Sept-October 1999 1183 Aug-September 2003 1200 February-March 2006  1200 
Nigeria January-February 2000 3603  Sept-October 2003  2400 Aug-December 2005  2363 
South Africa July-August 2000 2200 Sept-October 2002  2400 February 2006 2400 
Uganda May-June 2000 2271 Aug-September 2002 2400 April-May 2005 2400 
Tanzania March-May 2000 2198 July-August 2003  1200 July-August 2005 1304 
Zambia Oct-November 1999 1198 June-July 2003  1200 July-August 2005 1200 
Zimbabwe Sept-October 1999 1200 April-May 2004  1200 October 2005 1048 
Cape Verde   May-June 2002  1268 March-April 2005 1256 
Mozambique   August-October 2002 1400 June 2005 1198 
Kenya   Aug-September 2003 2400 September 2005 1278 
Senegal   Nov-December 2002 1200 Sept-October 2005 1200 
Madagascar     May-June 2005 1350 
Benin     April-May 2005 1198 
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All Afrobarometer surveys are conducted through personal, face-to-face interviews 
of random, clustered, stratified and proportionate samples of citizens 18 years of 
age and older. Samples are drawn based on the most recent census data through a 
four stage process that randomly samples (1) census enumerator areas, (2) 
interviewer start points, (3) households, and (4) respondents.  Sampling frames are 
constructed in the first stages from the most up-to-date census figures or 
projections available, and thereafter from census maps, systematic walk patterns, 
and project-generated lists of household members. The minimum sample size of 
1200 provides an average margin of sampling error of approximately +/- 3 
percentage points (2.8 points).  Larger samples of at least 2,400 are regularly drawn 
in more diverse societies like South Africa and Nigeria in order to obtain more 
precise estimates of sub-national variations. Disproportionate sampling is 
sometimes used for the purposes of drawing over-samples amongst numerically 
small but politically important groups like Indian and Coloured respondents in 
South Africa, or the residents of Zanzibar in Tanzania. Because interviews are 
conducted in the language of the respondents’ choice, the questionnaire is 
translated into all local languages covered by the drawn sample, interviewers are 
selected based on their fluency in local languages, and a strong emphasis is placed 
on interviewer training.   
 
A caveat is in order about our ability to generalise. Not only is each country sample 
drawn independently, but many sub-Saharan countries are not represented. Thus, 
the findings reported here may not be able to be extended to large parts of 
Francophone Africa, to the continent’s remaining authoritarian regimes, or to 
“fragile states” that are imploding through civil war. If we occasionally refer to 
“Africans” we have a more limited populace in mind.   
 
 
Poverty and Democracy 
 
As suggested at the outset to this article, political scientists have widely regarded 
the prospects for successful political democratization and economic liberalization 
in Africa as remote, due principally to the impact of widespread poverty and 
destitution (Ake, 1996). In fact, one of the clearest findings of empirical political 
science is that the prospects of sustaining democratic government in a poor society 
are far lower than in a relatively wealthy one (Lipset, 1959; Bollen and Jackman, 
1989; Przeworski et al, 2000). Precisely why poverty undermines democracy, 
however, has been much less clear. 
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Some scholars locate the linkage primarily at the macro level, arguing that poor 
societies constitute particularly infertile soil in which to consolidate democracy.  
They usually lack a sizable middle class, and may be less able to ameliorate clashes 
over resources by distributing wealth more widely and equitably (Huntington, 
1991). The lack of modernization, particularly in terms of schools and news media, 
may also create insufficient cultural support for basic principles such as tolerance 
and self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). And poorer societies may also 
simply be less able to provide the resources necessary for effective political 
institutions, ranging from legislatures, to electoral administration commissions, to 
policy planning staff.   
 
Others locate the problem at the micro level.  Some scholars have argued that poor 
Africans focus on, and prioritize substantive policy outcomes, rather than decision-
making procedures (Ake, 1996), or that they have unrealistic expectations of 
democracy (Johnson & Schlemmer, 1996). Poor people might also have less reason 
to care about, or more simply less time to devote to the types of activities that give 
life to democracy, such as voting, joining with others to voice their preferences to 
government, or contacting elected representatives themselves. 
 
Still others have completely reversed the causal arrow, arguing that democracy and 
freedom breed development. Przeworski et al’s (2000) major study of the linkages 
of development and democracy between 1950 and 1990 failed to find any 
difference between the subsequent development trajectories of democracies and 
autocracies. But by extending the scope of analysis to the end of the 1990s, and by 
using a more precise measure of democracy, Halperin et al (2005) have produced 
important evidence of a “democracy advantage” whereby democracies, at all levels 
of material wealth, are more likely to increase quality of life (e.g. growth, as well as 
better health, education and food production), and more democratic countries are 
better able to do so than less democratic countries. 
 
 
Measuring Lived Poverty 
 
Economists usually measure poverty with data collected from national accounts 
(such as Gross Domestic Product), or through population surveys of whole 
societies (national censuses) or dedicated surveys of representative samples of 
households.  The typical demographic or socio-economic household survey usually 
contacts a relatively large sample (often 10,000 or more) and interviews an 
informant who provides objective information about the economic conditions and 
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behaviours of the household. They generally devote an extensive questionnaire to 
measuring household income, assets, expenditure and access to services.  The range 
of subjects covered by such questionnaires has expanded gradually over the past 
two decades, in step with the burgeoning conceptualization of poverty, a process 
that has often been spurred by researchers working in developing country contexts 
dissatisfied with a narrow focus on money metric measures.  Researchers have 
attempted to develop a more multi-faceted definition that includes many aspects of 
well-being and inequality that better reflects the lived experiences of people, 
especially the poor. The best expression of this trend can be seen in the definition 
used by the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen.   
“Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and 
productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; 
hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to 
education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality 
from illnesses; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe 
environments and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also 
characterised by a lack of participation in decision-making and in 
civil, social and cultural life … Absolute poverty is a condition 
characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including 
food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education, and information.  It depends not only on income but also on 
access to services.” 
 
Accordingly, researchers have built various indices that add to, or substitute for 
income data by measuring aspects such as life expectancy, caloric intake, height 
and weight, formal education, literacy, employment, quality of housing, and access 
to services. Others have developed more subjective measures of exclusion and 
deprivation. Yet many of the things measured in the name of a broader, more multi-
dimensional notion of poverty, are in fact, not poverty, but closely related 
antecedents or consequences of poverty (Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002).  
 
However, it is very difficult to accommodate either the broader or the narrower 
approaches to poverty measurement in a typical social science attitude survey.  
While there are, of course, many commonalities between the usual socio-economic 
and demographic household survey and an attitude survey like the Afrobarometer, 
there are also many important differences.  Public opinion surveys usually contact a 
relatively small sample of households (generally between 1,200 and 2,400), 
interview a randomly selected member of a household, and focus on subjective 
preferences, beliefs and values.  And because public opinion surveys devote most 
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of their questionnaire space to measuring attitudes, it is not possible to devote the 
kind of time to measuring the extensive range of economic conditions and activities 
included in socio-economic surveys.   
 
Thus the Afrobarometer needed to develop a measure of poverty that could be 
gathered from the sampled respondent (rather than generated from a household 
informant through a roster of items about household activities). Respecting the 
central tenet of modern economics, that people are the best judges of their own 
interest, we assumed that respondents were best placed to tell us about their quality 
of life, though they might not be able to provide the kind of precision economists 
desire. We also needed a measure that focussed efficiently and directly on the 
central, core aspect of poverty, namely the rate at which people actually go without 
the basic necessities of life. Thus we adopted and developed a small experiential 
battery of items first asked in the New Russia Barometer (Rose, 1998) that did 
exactly this.  
 
The root of the Afrobarometer battery of questions reads: “Over the past year, how 
often, if ever have you or your family gone without _____?”  The interviewer then 
repeats the question for each of the following basic necessities:  “Enough food to 
eat?”  “Enough clean water for home use?”  “Medicines or medical treatment?”  
“Enough fuel to cook your food?”  “A cash income?”  And “School expenses for 
your children (like fees, uniforms or books)?”  However, while people may be the 
best judges of their own well-being and quality of life, survey researchers need to 
avoid forcing respondents to report their recalled experiences at an inappropriately 
fine level of precision. Thus, rather than asking people to provide us some ratio 
level answer, such as the number of days out of 365, or the number of weeks out of 
52, we simply provide an ordinal level response scale with the options: “Never,” 
“Just Once or Twice,” “Several Times,” “Many Times,” or “Always”? 
 
The responses to these items in Round 3 surveys demonstrate that “Lived Poverty” 
is extensive across the 18 African countries surveyed between February 2005 and 
February 2006. In every country, the most commonly reported shortage (as 
measured by those who had gone without at least once) was a cash income. This 
aspect of poverty was followed by shortages of medical care, food, school 
expenses, clean water, and cooking fuel, in that order (Figure 1). While the average 
(median) African went without a cash income “several times” over the previous 
year, the typical experience with food, medical treatment and school expenses 
(among those with children in the family) was to have experienced “just one or 
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two” shortages.  The average (median) African said she “never” went without clean 
water, or home cooking fuel.   
 
 





However, these items also find substantial cross national variation across each 
basic necessity.  For example, while three quarters of all respondents say they 
experienced at least one shortfall in cash income over the past year, the figure 
ranges from a low of one half (50 percent) of South Africans to virtually all (94 









Validity and Reliability 
 
Yet it is possible to elicit responses to a set of just about any survey items. The 
important question is whether the combined responses tap a common underlying 
concept that we can call “lived poverty.” There are several different logical and 
empirical criteria for establishing this.  First of all, we believe that the index has a 
high degree of face validity (or the extent to which an indicator measures the 
concept for which it is intended).  If Amartya Sen (1999) is right and the value of 
one’s standard of living lies in the living itself, an experiential measure of shortages 
of basic necessities of life takes us directly to the central core of what the concept 
of poverty is all about.  We also believe that by tapping a range of necessities, our 
measure offers an acceptable level of content validity (the extent to which a 
measure taps the full breadth of a concept).  
 
But beyond these logical criteria, there is impressive empirical evidence of the 
internal construct validity of our battery of items.  Previous research established the 
validity and reliability of the scale in Round 1 surveys in seven (Mattes, Bratton 
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and Davids, 2002; and Bratton and Mattes, 2003) and eleven countries (Bratton, 
Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), and Round 2 surveys in 15 countries (Bratton, 
2006). Turning to the Round 3 data for 18 countries, factor analysis (which 
measures the extent to which the components of an index appear to tap a common 
underlying theoretical concept) extracts a single unrotated factor from the 25,359 
responses to the five items that explains 53.5 percent of the common variance 
across all items2. Shortages in medical treatment most strongly define this factor (as 
expressed by the factor loadings, or the correlation between each variable and the 
extracted factor), and shortages of clean water the least. However, the range 
between the two is relatively small. Taken together, these results strongly suggest 
that all items tap a single underlying concept of “lived poverty,” and that they tap a 
reasonably diverse spread of experiences within that concept. The responses also 
demonstrate a high degree of reliability or internal consistency. Cronbach’s Alpha, 
which expresses the average inter-item correlation, is quite high at .78 (with .6 
usually being the minimal cut off point in large surveys of diverse populations) 
(Table 2).  
 
Not only are validity and reliability measures quite strong for the total 18 country 
sample in Round 3, they are very consistent across all country samples (Table 2).  
Factor analysis extracted a single, unrotated factor within each country sample, and 
the percentage of common variance explained by the extracted factor ranged from a 
low of 42.3 percent in Mozambique to a high of 64.5 percent in Nigeria. While the 
rank-ordering of the factor loadings shows more cross national variance, this 
simply demonstrates that lived poverty manifests itself in slightly different ways in 
differing national contexts. 
 
                                                 
2 The item on school expenses was excluded since 18 percent of all respondents could not answer 
because they either had no children or there were none in the family. 
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Table 2: Validity and Reliability of Lived Poverty Index (Afrobarometer Round 3 Surveys, Circa 2005) 
 
 Total Ben Bot CV Gha Ken Les Mad Mlw Mal Moz Nam Nig Sen SAfr Tan Uga Zam Zim 
Eigenvalue 2.67 2.25 2.53 3.02 2.70 2.75 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.18 2.11 2.98 3.22 2.90 3.12 2.17 2.74 2.76 2.39 
% Variance 
Explained 
53.4 45.0 50.5 60.3 53.9 55.0 46.1 45.0 45.1 43.6 42.3 59.6 64.5 58.0 62.5 43.4 54.7 55.1 47.8 
Factor Loadings 
Health Care .74 .77 .61 .75 .75 .76 .69 .60 .58 .72 .63 .72 .79 .80 .73 .65 .77 .70 .55 
Cash .67 .58 .53 .74 .60 .63 .72 .70 .64 .60 .43 .61 .70 .62 .76 .64 .64 .65 .67 
Food .66 .65 .61 .60 .59 .68 .60 .65 .55 .56 .47 .70 .71 .71 .71 .54 .69 .74 .79 
Fuel .60 .40 .71 .81 .62 .59 .53 .39 .49 .48 .46 .73 .77 .71 .79 .42 .66 .61 .32 
Water .57 .36 .63 .65 .70 .65 .27 .42 .54 .33 .64 .77 .75 .62 .65 .45 .54 .61 .585 
                    
Reliability  .78 .67 .74 .83 .78 .79 .68 .69 .69 .66 .66 .83 .86 .82 .85 .66 .79 .79 .72 
N= 25,359 1182 1200 1256 1195 1275 1157 1349 1197 1244 1197 1198 2363 1195 2400 1303 2400 1200 1048 
 
All tests extracted a single unrotated dimension 
Reliability measured with Cronbach’s Alpha 
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Furthermore, the factor analysis and reliability analysis results appear quite stable 
across rounds of surveys. A factor analysis of these same items included in the 
Round 2 also extracted a single unrotated factor, with the exact same rank ordering 
in the factor loadings of each of the five items as in Round 3 (Table 3a). Because 
there were some differences in the content and wording of Round 1 questionnaires 
across countries, it is not possible to conduct a similar analysis of the five item 
scale. I thus recalculated a three item scale (water, food and medical treatment) that 
could be compared for 11 countries across the three rounds (Table 3b) as well as a 
5 item scale that could be compared for seven countries across all three rounds 
(Table 3c). All scales produce a single unrotated factor, have relatively similar 
factor loadings of the various components, and have a sufficiently high level of 
reliability (with the possible exception of the three item scale in Round 1, which is 
due largely to the fact that some of the countries used differing numbers of 
response categories).   
 
 
Table 3: Over Time Validity and Reliability of Lived Poverty Index 
 
Table 3a.  Five Item Scale Over Time for 16 Countries 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Eigenvalue X 2.43 2.73 
Variance Explained -- 48.7% 54.6% 
Factor Loadings    
Health Care -- .714 .738 
Cash Income -- .635 .670 
Food -- .631 .664 
Home Fuel -- .514 .619 
Water -- .494 .594 
    
Reliability -- .73 .79 
N = -- 23,787 22,828 
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Table 3b.  Three Item Scale Over Time for 11 Countries 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Eigenvalue 1.66 1.76 1.87 
% Variance Explained 55.2% 58.8% 62.5% 
Factor Loadings    
Health Care .631 .790 .750 
Food .658 .565 .633 
Water .438 .511 .604 
    
Reliability .59  .698 
N = 19,067 15,224 15,510 
 
 
Table 3c.  Five Item Scale Over Time for Seven Countries 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Eigenvalue 2.45 2.57 2.77 
% Variance Explained 49.1% 51.4% 55.5% 
Factor Loadings    
Cash Income .713 .707 .726 
Food .667 .733 .708 
Health Care .612 .665 .700 
Water .496 .487 .600 
Fuel .515 .525 .593 
    
Reliability .74 .76 .80 
N = 8,949 9,373 9,400 
 
 
Based on this knowledge, we can then safely create a Lived Poverty Index (LPI) 
and calculate an index score for each individual and for each country on a five 
point scale that runs from 0 (which can be thought of as no lived poverty) to 4 
(which would be complete lived poverty, or constant absence of basic necessities).  
The mean level of Lived Poverty across all 18 countries is 1.3 with a substantial 
cross national variation around that mean that ranges from 1.96 in Zimbabwe to 
0.82 in South Africa.3 
 
                                                 
3 National differences account for .095 percent of the variance in Lived Poverty (Eta = 308). 
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Figure 3:  Average Lived Poverty, 2005-2006  





We have thus far shown that people who report shortages on one aspect tend to go 
without other aspects. But to what extent does the data produced by the LPI predict, 
or correlate with other widely used indicators of poverty or other theoretically 
associated concepts (what is referred to as “criterion validity”)?  Previous research 
demonstrates important linkages at both the micro- and macro-levels. At the micro 
level, respondents’ levels of lived poverty decrease predictably with increasing 
levels of formal education, employment (Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002; Bratton 
& Mattes, 2003) or income (Bratton, 2006). Respondents’ subjective self-
placement on a ladder of well-being also increases as their lived poverty decreases 
(Bratton, 2006).   
 
Controlling for the simultaneous impact of other relevant variables, lived poverty 
shapes a range of political preferences.  It increases respondent’s sense of relative 
deprivation (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), and decreases their approval of 
government management of the economy (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), their support 
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for private provision of development services (Bratton and Mattes, 2003), and their 
support for economic reform (Bratton and Mattes, 2003; Bratton, Mattes & 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, it has little impact on their policy priorities 
(Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002), and no impact on whether they hold a 
procedural (e.g. free speech) or substantive understanding (e.g. a small income gap) 
of democracy (Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002), or on their commitment to 
democratic reform (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 
2007). 
 
However, lived poverty has a range of less predictable consequences for 
democratic citizenship. Unsurprisingly, it decreases people’s use of the news media 
(Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002), but it has little impact on their interest in 
politics, sense of political efficacy or trust in other citizens (Mattes, Bratton and 
Davids, 2002; Bratton, 2006). In fact, the poor are more likely to take part in 
community affairs, contact officials and informal leaders, and vote (Mattes, Bratton 
& Davids, 2002; Bratton, 2006). 
 
Across seven Round 1 Southern African countries, the poor are more likely to 
protest (Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002), but there was no visible impact across all 
Round 1 surveys (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).  Country studies have 
found conflicting results reflecting differing national political circumstances. In 
South Africa, poverty is a strong indicator of participation in local community 
politics and protest (Mattes, 2008).  In Zimbabwe, however, the poor are some of 
the least likely to take part in protest (Mpani, 2007).  
 
At the macro level, previous studies have found very strong relationships across 
seven Southern African countries between national lived poverty and GDP Per 
Capita, but less so with other indicators such as the World Bank’s estimate of the 
proportions of people living on less than $1 a day, the United Nation Development 
Programme’s Human Development Index, infant mortality or under-5 mortality 
(Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002).  There are also strong relationships within South 
Africa between provincial levels of lived poverty and per capita monthly household 
income as well as a Household Circumstances Index (which combines three 
measures of household employment and composition) and a Household 
Infrastructure Index (which combines 8 measures of access to services) developed 
by Statistics South Africa (Mattes, Bratton & Davids, 2002). 
 
To examine this question with Round 3 data, I collected data on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), Gross National Product Per Capita (GDP), and World 
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Bank estimates of the proportions of people living on less than US$1 a day for 
2005. The results show that the association between national levels of lived poverty 
and HDI runs in the right direction (as national levels of lived poverty increase, 
human development decreases) but the macro-level correlation is very weak for 18 
cases (Pearson’s r =-.389). And the empirical link between lived poverty and the 
World Bank’s estimate of the proportion of people living on less than US1$ a day 
(and one of the two key indicators of Millennium Development Goal 1), is virtually 
non-existent (r=.191 for 15 countries: Lesotho, Cape Verde and Uganda have no 
recent data).   
 
At the same time, we find a much stronger correlation between the LPI and GDP 
Per Capita (r=-.652**) (the association is slightly stronger using GDP Purchasing 
Power Parity (-.693***). Yet the association is not so strong as to conclude that 
they are measuring the same thing.  While countries with greater levels of national 
wealth per capita have lower levels of lived poverty, the relationship is not linear.  
As we see in Figure 4, lived poverty drops precipitously once a country moves over 
the $1000 per capita level. Out of 14 countries with GDP Per Capita less than 
$1000, only Ghana has a level of lived poverty comparable to the four wealthiest 
countries in the Afrobarometer (Cape Verde, Namibia, South Africa and 
Botswana).   
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Figure 4:  Gross Domestic Product Per Capita and Lived Poverty, 2005 
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A final way to examine validity and reliability is to examine how the LPI functions 
over time, and whether temporal changes in lived poverty are associated with 
changes in other related indicators, such as national wealth?  In the only existing 
research that has addressed this question, Johnson (2007) has found that the level 
democracy of ten countries in 1999-2000 was a strong predictor of subsequent 
changes in poverty, with higher levels of democracy predictive of poverty 
reduction. 
 
In order to generate comparable results across the three Afrobarometer rounds of 
surveys, I restrict this analysis to only those 11 countries where at least three of the 
Lived Poverty items (food, medical treatment, cash income) were asked in each 
round (the Uganda questionnaire did not carry this scale in Round 1).  Across these 
11 countries, lived poverty increased significantly between Round 1 and Round 2 
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(0.68 to 0.73 on a three point scale running from 0 to 2), but leveled off between 
Round 2 and Round 3 (.73 to .74).4  
 
 
Figure 5: Changes in Lived Poverty (2000-2005) 




However, this masks important differences between countries.  We witnessed sharp 
reductions in lived poverty between Round 1 (circa 2000) and Round 3 (circa 2005) 
in Lesotho (.97 to .76, though the real drop occurred only after 2003) and Namibia 
(.81 to .63), less so in Zambia (.99 to .90) and very slightly in South Africa (.58 to 
.50) and Ghana (.53 to .51) (Figure 6).  However, we observe sharp increases in 
lived poverty in  Zimbabwe (.90 to 1.21), Nigeria (.59 to .74), Malawi (.81 to .92) 
and Tanzania (.71 to .81), and very slightly in Botswana (.44 to .50) and Mali (.61 
to .63) (Figure 7). 
 
                                                 
4 The difference between the Round 1 and Round 2 11 country mean index score is far larger than 
the twice the standard error of either mean.  However, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the 
Round 2 and Round 3 mean scores overlap. 
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Figure 6: Decreasing Lived Poverty (2000-2005) 




Figure 7: Increasing Lived Poverty (2000-2005) 




The trends we have observed in lived poverty across 11 countries differ from recent 
conclusions drawn by the World Bank about sub-Saharan Africa, where they claim 
that strong growth has cut the estimated proportions who live in extreme poverty 
(living on less than 1$US a day) by 4.7 percentage points (from 45.8 to 41.1 
percent) between 1999 and 2004 (World Bank, 2007). These differences could, of 
course, simply be a function of differing country samples. But there are also 
important variances within specific countries.  While the specific country data does 
not appear to be publicly available, the World Bank (2006) claims that Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda have all “lifted significant percentages 
of their citizens above the poverty line” (2006: 1). Yet as seen above, the LPI 
shows significant decreases in lived poverty in Cape Verde (-.11) and Ghana (-.02), 
but registers increases in Mozambique (+0.14), Uganda (+0.09) and Senegal (+.05) 
(Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Changes in Lived Poverty in 5 Countries with Reductions in 
Percentage of People Living on <$1 a Day 







In fact, while we have demonstrated a fairly substantial link between national 
wealth and lived poverty, there is virtually no association between changes in 
national wealth (or GDP growth) and changes in poverty. Across all 18 
Afrobarometer countries, there does appear initially to be at least a weak case to be 
made that higher levels of growth (as measured by the average growth rate between 
2000 and 2005) led to lower levels of lived poverty in 2005 (r=-.445), and that this 
growth also produced poverty reduction (as measured by changes in the LPI score 
between Round 1 and Round 3 for 11 countries that had measures in all three 
rounds (r=.439). However, a visual inspection of the scatterplot suggests that this 
relationship was driven completely by the combination of very high levels of 
negative growth and very high levels of poverty increases in Zimbabwe. Once 
Zimbabwe is removed from the calculation, the association between average 
growth and poverty in 2005 disappears (r=.058) and the relationship between 
growth and poverty reduction actually changes direction (r=-.593).  Among the 10 
Afrobarometer countries that have LPI index scores for both Rounds 1 and 3, 
excluding Zimbabwe, GDP growth is actually accompanied by increases in lived 
poverty.5  In fact, the four countries that enjoyed an average growth rate of over 5.5 
percent during this period (Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali and Botswana) all experienced 
significant increases in lived poverty. Precisely why growth has not reduced 
poverty in these countries is a subject too broad to be addressed in this article.   
 
                                                 
5 This finding also holds when we measure poverty reduction only between Round 2 and Round 3 
for 14 countries (r=-.505). 
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Figure 9: GDP Growth (2000-2005) and Changes in Lived Poverty (Round 
1 to Round 3) 
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To sum up what we have found thus far, we have strong internal, micro-level 
support for the validity and reliability of the LPI.  But the LPI exhibits only 
moderate external validity when compared with absolute measures of national 
wealth, and weak relationships with measures of human development or income 
poverty.  Moreover, its overtime relationship with GDP growth stands in stark 
contrast to the typical economic consensus.  Does this mean that the Afrobarometer 
LPI is not measuring poverty? Or does it mean that we are tapping crucial, 
experiential aspects of the “business end” of poverty often missed by other 
objective metric measures?   
 
In order to reconcile this apparent paradox, I take another look at the external 
validity of the LPI from an altogether different perspective on development and 
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poverty which proceeds from the position developed by Nobel Laureate Amartya 
Sen (1999: 152-154) who emphasizes the crucial importance of freedom and 
democracy for development, especially through the freedom of choice.  
“[F]reedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its 
primary means” (1999: 10)  
 
Given this logic, I ask whether lived poverty might be more a function of political 
freedom and democracy, rather than, or in addition to national material wealth.  
The first piece of evidence that this might be true can be seen in the fact that lived 
poverty has a significantly higher correlation with indicators of political freedom 
(as measured by the combined reversed Freedom House measures of political rights 
and political liberties) than with national wealth.  For all 18 countries, a country’s 
level of lived poverty in 2005 is very strongly, and negatively correlated with its 
level of political freedom in the same year (r=-.832***). Moreover, the link 
between freedom and lived poverty is independent of any simultaneous influence of 
wealth on both factors.  …. 
 
Table 4:  The Impact1 of Wealth Vs Freedom on National Lived Poverty2 
 
 Pearson’s r Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant)  1.466*** .769*** .954*** 
     
GDP Per Capita, 2005 -.652** -.652**  -.353* 
Freedom House Combined 
Score, 2005 
 -.832***  -.832***   -.676*** 
     
Adj. R2  .389 .673 .793 
N  18 18 18 
 
1.  Standardized Regression Coefficients 
 
2.  The dependent variable is the Round 3 national mean Lived Poverty Index score (composed of 
reported shortages of health care, cash income, food, home fuel and water) 
 
 
A second piece of evidence can be found in the fact that while lived poverty has 
weak if not perverse linkages with GDP growth, it has moderately strong and 
predictable linkages with democratization.  That is, current levels of national lived 
poverty across the 18 countries are clearly associated with past changes in political 
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freedom: that is, the more a country expanded political liberties and political rights 
between 2003 and 2005, the lower its level of lived poverty in 2005 (r=-625**).  
And amongst the 11 countries that have lived poverty scores for both Rounds 1 and 
3, I find that the more a country democratized between 1999 and 2005, the more it 
reduced its levels of poverty over the same time period (r=-.710*) (Figure 10).  
Moreover, democratization is a better explanation of poverty reduction than GDP 
growth (Table 5). 
 
 
Figure 10:   
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Table 5:  The Impact1 of Growth vs. Democratization on Changes in 
National Lived Poverty2 
 
 Pearson’s r Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant)  .091 .049 .071 
     
GDP Growth, 
2000-2005 
-.439 -.439  -.148 
Democratization, 
1999-2005 
  -.710**  -.710*  -.644* 
     
Adj. R2  .103 .450 .402 
N= 11 11 11 11 
 
1.  Standardized Regression Coefficients 
 
2.  The dependent variable is the difference between the Round 1 and Round 3 national mean 
Lived Poverty Index score (composed of reported shortages of health care, food, and water) 
 
 
A fourth and final piece of evidence of the political bases of lived poverty can be 
found at the micro-level. Using Round 3 data, I regressed a range of individual 
level variables on respondents’ LPI scores. The variables measure the level of 
wealth of the country in which they reside (GDP Per Capita) as well as the level of 
political freedom (the Freedom House combined political rights and political 
liberties score).  But I also compare the impact of these national effects to that of a 
series of contextual, local level measures observed by Afrobarometer fieldworkers 
and field supervisors in the primary sampling unit in which the interview was 
conducted.  When factor analyzed these breakdown into three separate measures of 
the extent of local development infrastructure (whether or not there is an electricity, 
piped water and sewage grid), state infrastructure (whether or not there is a post 
office, police station and health clinics) and community infrastructure (whether or 
not there are schools, market stalls, and buildings or facilities for community 
meetings, religious worship and recreation).  Finally, I test the relative impact of a 
series of individual level characteristics captured by the Afrobarometer, namely the 
respondent’s level of formal education, age, gender, employment status, 
occupational class, and whether or not they live in a rural or urban area. 
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As theoretically guided blocks of variables (Models 1 thru 4 in Table 6), the density 
of development, community and state infrastructure and the collection of individual 
level characteristics account for the greatest proportion of variance in respondents’ 
LPI scores (9 percent and 11 percent respectively).  Political freedom accounts for 
5 percent and national wealth accounts for just 1 percent. Altogether, these 
variables can account for 18 percent of the variance in respondents’ levels of lived 
poverty. And once the simultaneous impact of all other variables is taken into 
account (in Model 5 in Table 6), the national context of political freedom has the 
single strongest impact on a respondent’s level of lived poverty (Beta, the 
standardized regression coefficient = -.245***), outpacing the respondent’s level of 
formal education (-.219***) and the level of development infrastructure (sewage, 
water and electricity grids) in the immediate locality (-.153***).  
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Table 6:  Personal Lived Poverty: Explanatory Factors Compared1 2 
 
 Pearson’s r Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant  1.344*** 1.548*** 1.556*** 1.905*** 2.430 
       
National Wealth -.080*** -.080***    .079*** 
Development 
Infrastructure 
-.130***  -.297***   -.153*** 
State Infrastructure -.299***  -.030***   -.005 
Community 
Infrastructure 
-.069***  .034***   .019* 
Formal Education -.268***   -.194***  -.219*** 
Rural  .244***   .166***  .055*** 
Female .010   -.027***  -.022*** 
Age .066***   -.005  .021*** 
Employment -.149***   -.092***  -.076*** 
Under Class -.031***   -.041***  -.015* 
Working Class -.070***   -.032***  .002 
Middle Class -.110***   -.026***  -.013* 
Political Freedom -.206***    -.206*** -.245*** 
       
Adj R2  .006 .091 .111 .043 .175 
N=  25,359 25,344 25,051 25,359 25,036 
 
1.  Standardized Regression Coefficients 
 
2.  The dependent variable is the Round 3 Lived Poverty Index score (composed of reported shortages of health care, cash income, 




The cost of large scale demographic or socio-economic household surveys of 
income, expenditure, infrastructure and life circumstances means that they are 
undertaken relatively infrequently in developing countries.  In contrast, because the 
Afrobarometer’s Lived Poverty Index takes up relatively little questionnaire space, 
it can be used more frequently on a range of different types of surveys with 
relatively smaller samples.  This would enable policy makers to track national and 
sub-national trends in the overall extent of lived poverty or of its subcomponents, 
such as hunger, with confidence. The LPI has strong cross-sectional individual 
level construct validity and reliability within any national sample, as well as cross-
national validity and reliability across country samples. Moreover, it displays 
strong overtime internal integrity across rounds of surveys. Yet it also displays 
inconsistent levels of external validity as a measure of aggregate level poverty 
when compared to other objective, materialist measures of poverty such as national 
wealth, income poverty, or human development. However, its external validity is 
quite strong if poverty is viewed as much a function of political freedom as 
material wealth.  Lived poverty is very strongly related to country level measures 
of political freedom, and changes in poverty are related to changes in freedom.  
This finding simultaneously supports Sen's (1999) arguments about the crucial 
importance of freedom for development as freedom. Yet using different measures 
of both development and democracy, it also corroborates Halperin et al’s (2005) 
findings about a “democracy advantage” for well being and prosperity. It also 
increases our confidence that we are indeed measuring the experiential core of 
poverty, and capturing it in a way that other widely used international development 
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